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29 JUN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of External Affairs

25X1 ATTENTION: [REDACTED]

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]

Director of Security

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Congressional Inquiry (U)

REFERENCE: Letter to DCI dated 21 June 1983 from  
Representatives Don Edwards and Patricia Schroeder (attached)

E R - 1128/87 22

1. On 23 June 1983 representatives of this Office attended a meeting of interested parties with [REDACTED] Deputy General Counsel, to discuss an appropriate response to referent. This Office was tasked with preparing a response to requirement number one of referent, to wit: "A description of the procedures your agency follows to detect unauthorized disclosure of national security information and the criteria used to determine whether any further action is warranted in light of such unauthorized disclosure." (U/AIUO)

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2. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilizes the following procedures to detect unauthorized disclosure of national security information:

- ° Field investigations and National Agency Checks as appropriate for individuals being considered for employment, assignment, or access to CIA installations and/or information.

- ° Periodic field investigations and National Agency Checks as appropriate in conjunction with the Agency's reinvestigation program.

- ° Polygraph examinations as authorized by regulation for employment candidates and non-Agency personnel such as detailees and contractor employees prior to being hired or granted access to CIA information.

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
OR METHODS INVOLVED

[REDACTED]

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- ° Polygraph examinations as authorized by CIA regulations in conjunction with the Agency's reinvestigation program and at other times in order to assist in resolving specific questions relating to the individual's loyalty, security posture, or suitability.

- ° Utilization of established physical security safeguards such as armed guards, patrols, alarm systems, etc., to prevent and provide response to attempts at physical penetration of the Agency's establishments by unauthorized persons.

- ° Strict control of certain categories of sensitive information and periodic inventory checks.

- ° Briefcase/package inspections designed to prevent the unauthorized removal of classified materials.

- ° The requirement that all Agency employees, as defined by regulation, and former employees submit for prior review by CIA certain materials intended for publication or oral presentation.

- ° Scanning of selected publications and program transcripts for obvious disclosures of classified information.

- ° Special security investigations to resolve specific cases involving the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by Agency-cleared personnel.

- ° An ongoing security education program which reminds and encourages employees to report violations of security regulations to appropriate Agency officials.

- ° An ongoing and close liaison relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other members of the Intelligence Community to provide support to their efforts directed at this problem and to provide lead information for further investigation by appropriate agencies in specific cases outside of CIA. (C)

3. Should an initial investigative inquiry indicate that a disclosure of national security information has occurred, the investigation will be continued. Every effort within legal and manpower limits are utilized to bring the investigation to a logical conclusion. Identification of the responsible wrongdoer(s),

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estimating the damage to national security, and establishing preventive measures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of similar unauthorized disclosures are central to the investigative effort. (C)

4. It is the understanding of this Office that responses to questions two and three will be made by the Office of General Counsel and the Office of External Affairs with appropriate coordination with the Office of Security. Please refer any questions concerning the above to [redacted] on red line extension [redacted] (C)

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Attachment  
Reference

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee  
1 - DDA

1 - D/Security  
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Proposed Response to Congressional Inquiry

FROM:

Director of Security  
4 E 60, Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

29 JUN 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DDA  
7 D 18, Hqs.

3. D/External Affairs  
Att: [redacted]  
7 B 24, Hqs.

The attached is a response to the Director of External Affairs outlining Office of Security investigative procedures and criteria to counter unauthorized disclosures. This requirement ultimately came from the House's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

Director of Security

Regraded Unclassified When  
Detached From Classified  
Attachment

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